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 ASSESSING ABNORMAL RETURNS: THE CASE OF 
CHINESE M&A ACQUIRING FIRMS 
 
1. Introduction   
 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in China has increased dramatically 
over the last 15 years.  This is due amongst other reasons to the remarkable 
growth rate in China’s economic output as well as China’s admission to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. However, research conducted into 
the area of Chinese M&A activities remains relatively sparse.  Moreover, such 
research as has been conducted on Chinese M&A activities is generally 
discursive and is not based on rigorous statistical analysis.  This paper 
provides more concrete empirical evidence of the impact that Chinese M&A 
activities have on the shareholders of acquiring firms by examining the returns 
of 279 randomly selected Chinese acquiring firms covering the period from 
1990 until 2008.  We also contrast our empirical results with those obtained in 
the prior literature for western economies in order that we might identify the 
underlying reasons for the differences which exist between the wealth effects 
of Chinese and western M&A activities. Here it is important to note that there 
are significant institutional differences between China and western countries 
which make it less likely that Chinese companies will overpay for target firms; 
firstly, all companies have state-owned shares on issue and in the event of a 
takeover the consideration for these shares is based on book rather than their 
market value and secondly, all deals have to receive regulatory approval 
before they are publicly announced and this greatly reduces the prospect of a 
bidding war for the target company. 
 
Furthermore, this paper analyses the impact of employing different modes of 
consideration (that is, payment methods) on Chinese acquiring firms both in 
terms of the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) using a 24-day event window surrounding the 
takeover announcement date.  We also identify potential reasons for the 
differing economic benefits that appear to arise from using cash as against 
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alternative modes of consideration1 for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms. Finally, we test if the pre-takeover stock values of acquiring firms have 
any relationship with the modes of consideration chosen to finance Chinese 
M&A activities. When there are informational asymmetries2 and a company is 
highly valued then the acquirer has an incentive to use alternative modes of 
consideration to pure cash (Hansen 1987). This enables the acquiring 
company to i) reduce the cost of takeover by issuing new shares at a low 
expected return (high price) and ii) transfer some of the risk associated with 
the deal to the target shareholders which benefits the acquirer’s shareholders.     
 
Our study makes three principal contributions to the M&A literature: i) Chinese 
acquirers overall have positive abnormal returns surrounding the takeover 
announcement date. This is in contrast with the vast majority of prior western 
literature which reports negligible and often negative benefits for acquiring 
firms (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008); ii) Alternative modes of 
consideration have higher abnormal returns than cash deals. This also 
contrasts with the prior western literature where cash deals tend to have 
higher CAARs than non-cash deals (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) ; iii) 
Finally, and consistent with the model of Hansen (1987), we find that in 
Chinese M&A activities alternative modes of consideration only earn higher 
CAARs than cash deals when the acquiring firm’s stock is highly valued. 
 
2. Summary of Prior Literature  
 
There is a voluminous western literature that examines wealth effects for M&A 
acquirers. In contrast, there is a relatively sparse literature3 that deals with the 
wealth effects of Chinese M&A activities, much of which is theoretical (as 
                                            
1 The alternative modes of consideration are mainly comprised of the acquiring firm’s stock.  
However, it may also consist of issuing convertible bonds in the acquiring firm, the issue of 
warrants by the acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the 
shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt by the 
acquiring firm or some combination of two or more of these alternative modes of 
consideration. 
 
2 In our sample there are informational asymmetries, for example most targets are unlisted 
firms. 
 
3 Since Chinese M&A activities only commenced in the 1990s and especially after China’s 
admission to WTO in 2001, the research conducted on Chinese M&A activities is not as 
exhaustive as it is in developed countries like the US and the UK. 
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distinct from empirical) in nature.  Both the western empirical literature and 
such empirical evidence as is available on Chinese M&A activities focuses on 
the pure wealth effects of M&A activities for the shareholders of acquiring 
firms. These empirical results are mixed and inconsistent on the central issue 
of whether acquiring firm shareholders obtain abnormal returns that are 
statistically different from zero; irrespective of whether one is dealing with the 
voluminous western literature or the relatively sparse Chinese literature. 
 
For example, Dodd and Ruback (1977) employ a sample of 172 U.S. 
acquiring firms covering the period from 1958 until 1976 and find that 
stockholders of successful bidding (that is, acquiring) firms earn positive 
abnormal returns in the month of the takeover announcement.  However, 
Asquith (1983) finds that the stock market shows little or no reaction on the 
date of the first public announcement of the merger and/or acquisition 
proposal and this applies for both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms. 
In contrast, Langtieg (1978) finds evidence of negative abnormal returns for 
acquiring firms over the six months before and twelve months after the 
acquisition date.  Bruner (2003) undertakes an extensive literature review in 
this area and concludes that in aggregate, abnormal returns to shareholders’ 
of acquiring firms from M&A activities are essentially zero. 
 
There are very few papers which examine the impact that M&A activities have 
on shareholder wealth for Chinese acquiring firms.  And the few papers that 
are available tend to focus on a narrow time period beginning in the mid to 
late 1990’s before China was admitted to the WTO in 2001.  Chen and Zhang 
(1999), for example, employ data for M&A transactions on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange covering the 1997 fiscal year.  Using a standard market model 
methodology they find that the CAARs associated with acquiring firms remain 
insignificantly different from zero over the entire event window.  Yu and Yang 
(2000) employ a sample comprised of all mergers and/or acquisitions which 
occurred on the two mainland Chinese (that is, the Shanghai and Shenzhen) 
stock exchanges over the period from 1993 until 1995.  They also find that the 
CAARs associated with the acquiring firms comprising their sample randomly 
fluctuated around zero over their entire event window.  In contrast, Li and 
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Chen (2002) investigated the M&A activities of firms listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 1999 to 2000.  They find 
that there are significant economic benefits for the shareholders of acquiring 
firms; in particular, the CAAR was a statistically significant 3% by the end of 
the 30-day post announcement event window used in their study.  Hence, 
such empirical evidence as there is paints a mixed and somewhat inconsistent 
picture about the wealth effects that M&A activities have on the shareholders 
of Chinese acquiring firms.4 
 
There is also a large volume of work in western countries as well as a growing 
literature in China that deals with the issue of whether the economic benefits 
obtained by Chinese acquiring firms hinge on the mode of consideration 
employed in their M&A activities.  Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1990) is one of 
the early western studies that deals with the economic benefits which accrue 
to shareholders of acquiring firms under different payment methods.  They 
employ a sample of 343 mergers listed on either the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) over the period 
from 1975 until 1983.  Their results indicate that both the abnormal 
percentage returns and the abnormal dollar returns for acquiring firms are 
smaller for stock financed takeovers in comparison to takeovers where the 
mode of consideration is solely in cash.  These results are consistent with 
most of the western literature in the area which consistently finds that the 
economic benefits which accrue to the shareholders of acquiring firms are 
larger for takeovers where the consideration is in cash in comparison to 
takeovers where alternative modes of consideration are employed (Amihud et 
al., 1990; Servaes, 1991; Brown and Ryngaert, 1991).  The one major 
exception is the paper by Yook (2003) which reports abnormal returns that are 
not statistically different between cash and stock acquisitions, although even 
here the magnitude of cash abnormal returns are still higher than stock deals.  
Yook (2003) also notes that there is some evidence that takeovers which turn 
out to be highly detrimental to shareholder wealth are more likely to be 
financed by the stock of the acquiring firm rather than in cash. 
                                            
4 From the literature summarised here we can see that very few studies examine takeover 
activities in China over a period of more than 2 years.  We address this issue by analysing 
Chinese M&A activities over the much longer period from 1990 until 2008. 
Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firms 
 
5 
 
 
There is also a small Chinese literature that addresses the issue of whether 
the economic benefits to shareholders of acquiring firms where the takeover 
consideration is solely in cash exceed the benefits which arise when the 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  However, the empirical work 
summarised in this literature reports inconsistent and often contradictory 
results. For example, using a sample of 96 acquisitions that occurred in China 
in 2006, Ge and Ping (2009) conclude that non-cash takeovers, which are 
principally comprised of share swap transactions, have positive wealth 
enhancing effects for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms over the 
short term; in contrast, cash based takeovers do not have significant wealth 
enhancing effects for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  Zhang, 
Wang and Meng (2007) also note that using cash as the sole mode of 
consideration for Chinese M&A activities can lead to Chinese acquiring firms 
securing pre-emptive rights in the form of a quick takeover.  They note that 
this is the reason why in hostile tender offers especially, cash is typically 
employed as the mode of consideration.  Nevertheless the vast majority of 
Chinese deals are friendly.   Zhang, Wang and Meng (2007) also note that 
most Chinese acquiring firms lack the free cash flows necessary for the 
internal financing of their M&A activities through cash offers.  They also note 
that when cash offers do occur it is normally the case that acquiring firms 
raise debt from banks and/or other financial institutions so that they can 
finance their M&A activities through cash.  Our study extends the sparse 
Chinese literature available in this area by i) conducting a more robust 
empirical analysis using recently developed nonparametric statistical 
techniques (Ataullah et al., 2011) and ii) examining M&A’s   that occur over 
the much longer time frame from 1990 until 2008, rather than just the one or 
two- year period that is typical of the pre-existing Chinese literature in the 
area.  We also investigate whether the relative value of the acquiring firm’s 
stock has any impact on the choice of the mode of consideration used to 
finance the takeover and on the CAARs earned by the acquiring firm as a 
result of the takeover as suggested in the model developed by Hansen 
(1987).  Finally, we provide evidence on the extent to which results from 
studies of M&A activities in developed countries like the U.S. and U.K. can be 
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generalised to Chinese capital markets which have very different legal and 
institutional structures when compared to capital markets in the west. 
 
3. Institutional Background and Data 
 
We have previously noted how there are two stock exchanges in mainland 
China; namely, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Moreover, “A” 
shares and “B” shares are the two categories of stock which are listed on both 
these exchanges.  The principal focus of our empirical analysis is with the A 
shares of Chinese acquiring firms since the market capitalisation of B shares 
is consistently lower than 1% of the total capitalised value of tradable A-
shares over the period covered by our empirical work (Ma 2014, 116) 5.  
 
Here we need to note that a unique feature of the mainland Chinese stock 
markets is that not all the A shares issued by firms are tradable, and this 
constitutes a significant difference from the stock markets in western countries 
like the USA and UK.  A shares can be sub-divided into three groups which 
are “state owned” shares, “legal person” shares and “public individual” shares 
in terms of the strictly defined groups of shareholdings in China.  State owned 
shares are those owned by the state, including the central and local 
governments. Legal person shares are those held by domestic legal entities 
and institutions such as state-private mixed enterprises and non-bank 
financial institutions (Qi and Wu, 2000).  An important point that needs to be 
made here is that only public individual shares are freely tradable on mainland 
stock markets; that is, state owned shares and legal person shares cannot be 
traded on these markets. Moreover, non-tradable A shares (that is, state 
shares and legal person shares) account for a majority of the A shares issued 
by most listed firms before 2005 at which time the China Securities Regulation 
Committee (CSRC) 6  issued a new plan for shareholding structure reform 
                                            
5  Until recently, only foreign investors (including investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macao) could purchase B shares.  Whilst both the principal and dividends of B shares are 
normally denominated in the RMB (Yuan), trading on the stock market in B shares normally 
occurs in either the US dollar or the Hong Kong dollar and not the Yuan.   
 
6  The CSRC is the main securities regulatory body in China and governs overall securities 
exchanges and futures markets activity within China. It includes more than 30 regulatory 
bureaus that cover different geographic regions of the country, and two supervisory bureaus 
at the nation's two largest stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  
Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firms 
 
7 
 
called ‘Guquan Fenzhi Gaige’. Under Guquan Fenzhi Gaige market-based 
processes are gradually being implemented for the transfer of share 
ownership rather than the government-imposed processes which had 
prevailed up until that point in time.  
 
The Measures for the Administration of Takeovers of Listed Companies7 as 
promulgated by the CSRC in 2006, stipulate that when an acquiring firm 
makes a takeover offer for a listed target firm two offer prices must be set for 
the shares of the listed target firm. 8  One offer price must be set for the 
tradable shares and another offer price must be set for the non-tradable 
shares in the listed target firm.  The offer price for the tradable shares of the 
listed target firm is determined by reference to the market price of those 
shares on the stock exchange whilst the offer price for the non-tradable 
shares is based on the net asset (book) value of the target firm as 
summarised in its latest set of audited financial statements.  Thus for these 
non-tradable shareholders the stock price is fixed when a takeover occurs and 
hence, the target firm has limited ability to negotiate or inflate its value.  
Finally, Article 28 of the Takeover Measures 2006 mandates that a takeover 
bid cannot be made public until the CSRC has been notified of the bid and 
can only be announced if no objections are raised by the CSRC.9  Given that 
regulatory approval is needed for a bid this limits the possibility of other 
interested parties counter-bidding for the target and thus again limits the 
ability for the target firm to inflate its value in the Chinese context. 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on the definition of a takeover given in Article 
84(1) of the Takeover Measures 2006.  This article provides that a takeover 
occurs when an acquiring firm successfully purchases more than 50% of the 
equity shares of a listed target firm. Data on Chinese mergers and 
acquisitions were obtained from the Data Company Mergers and Acquisitions 
                                                                                                                             
 
7  We shall henceforth refer to the Measures for the Administration of Takeovers of Listed 
Companies as the Takeover Measures 2006.   
 
8  See Song and Tippett (2013) for a detailed summary of the Takeover Measures (2006).  
 
9 The CSRC checks the bid is consistent with Chinese laws, administrative regulations and 
other related provisions. 
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[SDC (M&A)] Database.  Over the period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008 there were 2,448 cases on the SDC database where 
Chinese firms sought to acquire either a controlling or other interest in another 
firm.  However, only a small proportion of these acquisitions satisfied the 
definition of a takeover in Article 84(1) of the Takeover Measures 2006.  Given 
this, our empirical analysis is based on a random sample of 279=N  Chinese 
firms involved in acquisitions that satisfied the provisions of Article 84(1) of the 
Takeover Measures 2006 and that also had the prices of their A share prices 
available on the Datastream database.10  Table 1 provides a summary of the 
industrial classifications and the years in which the acquisitions occurred for 
the 279=N  acquiring firms on which our empirical analysis is based.  Thus, 
for the Household Goods and Home Construction classification there were 
two takeovers in 2006, one takeover in 2007 and two takeovers in 2008 – that 
is, five takeovers in total.  Data for the other industry classifications are to be 
similarly interpreted.   
 
Note how Table 1 also shows that there were only a small number of 
takeovers before China was admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
in 2001. There are two principal reasons for this.  First, the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively 
with only around 8 companies listed on each stock exchange.  From these 
humble beginnings the number of traded stocks gradually increased to 646 for 
the Shanghai stock exchange in 2001 and 508 for the Shenzhen stock 
exchange.  By 2015, these figures had grown to 1,081 for the Shanghai stock 
exchange and 1,746 for the Shenzhen stock exchange.  Hence, the relatively 
small number of companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges is the first factor contributing to the small number of mergers and 
acquisitions in China over the period from 1990 and 2001.  A second factor 
relates to the political and economic reforms which were implemented by 
Chinese government between 1990 and 2004 and which led to an average 
                                            
10  In an appendix to the paper (available from the authors on request) we use Cantelli’s 
Inequality (Savage, 1961, p. 216) to show that this sample is more than sufficient to 
generalise the empirical results we obtain to the entire sample of takeovers that do satisfy the 
provisions of Article 84(1) of the Takeover Measures (2006). 
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rate of growth in GNP in excess of 10% per annum over this period. 11  Many 
of these reforms were made in the run up to China’s admission to WTO in 
2001 and led to a significant increase in the number of small privately owned 
companies. 12   However, a significant proportion of these small private 
companies were under capitalised and performed poorly due to inadequate 
financing.  Acquiring these undercapitalised small private companies was a 
mechanism used by publicly listed companies to maintain the growth rates 
being demanded of them under the political and economic reforms which were 
being implemented by Chinese government at this time.  
 
 
We also divide the 279=N  Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample 
into two categories.  The first category is comprised of 168 acquiring firms 
where cash is the sole mode of consideration.  The second category involves 
45 acquiring firms where the mode of consideration is other than purely in 
cash. 13  The alternative modes of consideration employed by these latter 
firms include the issue of shares by the acquiring firm, the issue of convertible 
bonds by the acquiring firm, warrants issued by the acquiring firm, the transfer 
of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the shareholders of the target firm, 
the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt by the acquiring firm, or some 
combination of all of these.  Given that we can explicitly identify 168 pure cash 
transactions and 45 non pure-cash deals, we focus on comparing these two 
groups when testing if the mode of consideration affects the acquiring firms’ 
abnormal returns. 
 
Our empirical analysis is based around the following questions: i) What are 
the economic benefits that accrue to Chinese acquirers? (Section 5); ii) What 
                                            
11  Over this period the Chinese Chaorman, Xiaoping Deng, made a series of political 
pronouncements for market reforms which was to create a “socialist market economy”. In 
early 2000s a series of new economic policies were established, such as more balanced 
wealth distribution, improved education, medical care and social security.  
 
12 In a column entitled “All Change”, the 10 December, 2011 number of the Economist notes 
that “China had to relax over 7,000 tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers” in the run up to its 
admission to the WTO in 2001. 
 
13 There are 66 firms for which there was insufficient information on the SDC database to 
identify the mode of consideration used in the takeover. Thus, these 66 firms are excluded 
from our statistical analysis based on the payment method employed in the acquisition. 
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are the reasons for any differences in our empirical results when compared to 
those from the western literature in terms of economic benefits that accrue to 
acquiring firms? (Section 6); iii) What is the impact of using different payment 
methods for takeovers on the economic benefits which accrue to Chinese 
acquirers? (Sections 7 and 8) and, iv) What are the potential reasons of larger 
economic benefits for non-cash takeovers when compared to pure cash 
takeovers? (Section 9). Moreover, we use the newly developed Modified 
Corrado test of Ataullah et al. (2011) to assess the significance of the 
economic benefits which accrue to Chinese acquirers. However, we also 
conduct robustness tests on the significance of economic benefits for Chinese 
acquirers by using the original Corrado (1989) test and the Patell (1976) test 
throughout the paper. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
We retrieve daily closing share price data (adjusted for rights issues and other 
stock splits) from Datastream for the 279 Chinese acquiring firms comprising 
our sample as well as the required data relating to the relevant stock market 
indices. We then compute the continuously compounded daily returns for the 
A shares of these 279=N  acquiring firms.  The index used to proxy for the 
market index was the most inclusive index available for the particular stock 
market.  For example, the Shanghai stock Exchange Composite Index was 
selected as a proxy for the return on the market index for A shares traded on 
the Shanghai stock Exchange; the Shenzhen stock Exchange Composite 
Index was used to proxy for the market return for A shares listed on the 
Shenzhen stock Exchange.   
 
The standard hypothesis tested in the literature is that no economic rents (that 
is, excess returns) are earned by the shareholders of acquiring firms involved 
in M&A activities.  Hence our “base-line” methodology involves using the 
“market model” to determine the expected return on an acquiring firm’s A 
shares around the takeover announcement date.  The market model, takes 
the following form: 
 
 itmtiiit eRbaR ++=
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where itR  is the continuously compounded return on the A shares of the i
th 
firm during the tth time period (in our case, tth day) and mtR  is the continuously 
compounded return on the proxy for the market portfolio during the tth time 
period  (again, the tth day).  We estimate ib  using OLS and also, the Dimson 
(1979) procedure that ameliorates for thin-trading effects.  Finally, itit ARe =  is 
an estimate of the “unexpected” or “abnormal” return on the A shares of the ith 
firm during the tth time period.  All parameters are estimated using returns 
from 207 trading days preceding the announcement date of the proposed 
takeover until seven trading days prior to the announcement date; that is, the 
estimation period was over an interval comprising (-207, -7) trading days.  It is 
important to note that day zero (0) is defined as the first public announcement 
date of the proposed takeover as listed in the SDC (M&A) data base.  Our 
event window encompasses six trading days prior to the announcement of the 
takeover until 17 trading days subsequent to the announcement date; that is, 
an interval comprising (-6, +17) trading days.   
 
The average abnormal return on the tth trading day across the 279=N  
acquiring firms in our sample will be ∑
=
=
N
i
itt ARN
AAR
1
.1   Similarly, the 
cumulative abnormal return, ,itCAR  for the i
th firm on the tth trading day is 
obtained by summing the abnormal returns, ,itAR  for the given firm up to and 
including the tth trading day of the event window.  Since we use an event 
window comprised of 24=T  trading days this means that the cumulative 
abnormal return for the ith firm on the tth trading day of the event window will 
be computed as ∑
=
=
t
iit ARCAR
1
.
t
t   This in turn means that the cumulative 
average abnormal return on the tth day of the event window across the N firms 
comprising our sample will be ∑∑ ∑
= = =
==
t N
i
t
it AARARN
CAAR
1 1 1
.1
t t
tt   Now the 
central question here is whether the AAR’s and/or the CAAR’s on any 
particular date are significantly different from zero in a statistical sense.  Three 
statistics are used to make assessments of this hypothesis; namely the Patell 
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(1976) “t” statistic, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistic and the modified Corrado 
“z” statistic of Ataullah et al. (2011).  Since the modified Corrado statistic had 
the most consistent record of detecting abnormal performance and yet, is the 
least known of the three statistics, we now provide a brief summary of the 
testing procedures on which this statistic is based.14 
 
Suppose one estimates the market model and then computes the abnormal 
returns, ,itAR  for each of the Ni ___,,3,2,1=  acquiring firms comprising our 
sample across the Tt ____,,3,2,1=  daily time periods on which our empirical 
analysis is based.  One can then let TARK it ≤≤ )(1  be the rank for the i
th firm 
of the abnormal return during the tth time period.  It then follows that one can 
sum the ranks across the Ni ___,,3,2,1=  firms and thereby determine the 
significance of the sum of the abnormal returns on a given date (t) using the 
following non-parametric test statistic: 
 
                             ∑
=
+−
−
=
N
i
it TARKTN
z
1
21 )]1()(2[)1(
3                                (1) 
 
This is the modified Corrado test statistic for the AAR as developed by 
Ataullah et al. (2011, p. 592).  Here it can be shown that 1z  is asymptotically 
distributed )( ∞→N  as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 1963, p. 197). 
 
Moreover, one can also define the accumulated abnormal return for the ith 
firm, ,itMCAR  for M periods beyond the event period, t, as: 
 
∑
=
+=
M
j
jtiitM ARCAR
1
)(  
 
However, under the modified Corrado test, the concern is not so much with 
the abnormal return during any particular time period as it is with its rank 
                                            
14 Here it is important to emphasise that the modified Corrado test does not require the 
assumption that abnormal returns are normally distributed – unlike the parametric tests (e.g. 
Patell, 1976 and the standard “t” tests) that are normally applied in empirical work in this area 
of the literature.  Moreover, the modified Corrado test has a much higher relative asymptotic 
efficiency than other commonly used non-parametric tests of this type (Ataullah et al. 2011). 
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relative to the other T abnormal returns for the particular firm and period under 
investigation.  Given this, let: 
 
                                          ∑
=
+=
M
j
jtiitM ARKCARK
1
)( )()(                                    (2) 
 
be the sum of the ranks of the individual abnormal returns over the M periods 
beyond the event date (t) for the ith of the N firms on which the empirical 
analysis is based.  It then follows that one can determine the significance of 
the CAAR over the M periods beyond the event date (t) using the following 
non-parametric test statistic: 
 
                          ∑
=
+−
−+
=
N
i
itM TMCARKMTTMN
z
1
3 )]1()(2[))(1(
3              (3) 
 
This is the modified Corrado test statistic for the significance of the CAAR as 
developed by Ataullah et al. (2011, p.  597). Here it can be shown that 3z  is 
asymptotically distributed )( ∞→N  as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 1963, 
p. 197). 
 
We now develop the modified Corrado “z” statistic for comparing returns 
accruing to cash purchases with those from other modes of consideration.  
We begin by outlining the test for AARs.  Let citz  be the modified Corrado 1z  
statistic corresponding to the abnormal return for the ith acquiring firm on the 
tth day of the event window where the takeover consideration is purely in cash.  
It then follows that ∑
=
=
N
i
c
it
c
it zN
z
1
1  will be the average modified Corrado 1z  
statistic for the abnormal returns across the N firms during the tth day of the 
event window where the takeover consideration is solely in cash.  Moreover, 
Nz cit  will be asymptotically distributed )( ∞→N  as a standard normal variate 
(Fisz, 1963, p. 197).   
 
Next, let oitz  be the modified Corrado 1z  statistic corresponding to the 
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abnormal return for the ith acquiring firm on the tth day of the event window 
where the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  It then follows 
that ∑
=
=
M
i
o
it
o
it zM
z
1
1  will be the average modified Corrado 1z  statistic across the 
M firms during the tth day of the event window where the takeover 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  Furthermore, Mz oit  will be 
asymptotically distributed )( ∞→M  as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 1963, 
p. 197). 
 
Now, one can test the hypothesis that the mean modified Corrado 1z  score for 
acquiring firms where the consideration is solely in cash is identical to the 
mean modified Corrado 1z  score for acquiring firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash by using the test statistic: 
 
                                        }{
2
1 MzNzz oit
c
it
co
t −=                                       (4) 
 
which will be asymptotically ),( ∞→MN  distributed as a standard normal 
variate (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  This is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that 
the AAR on the tth day of the event window for the acquiring firms where the 
consideration is purely in cash is the same as the AAR on the tth day of the 
event window for acquiring firms where the consideration is other than purely 
in cash. 
 
Our testing procedures for the CAARs are analogous to those for the modified 
Corrado 1z  statistics associated with the AARs which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms and are based on the test statistic cotz  
which is defined as follows: 
 
                                               }{
2
1 MzNzz oit
c
it
co
t −=                                (5) 
 
Here citz  is the average modified Corrado 3z  statistic for the cumulative 
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abnormal returns across the Ni ___,,3,2,1=  acquiring firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash, oitz  is the average modified Corrado  3z  
statistic for the cumulative abnormal returns across the Mi ___,,3,2,1=  
acquiring firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash and 
17,16,15____,,4,5,6 −−−=t  is the particular date in the event window.  The 
probability density of the test statistic cotz  asymptotically ),( ∞→MN  
converges to that of the standard normal distribution (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  We 
emphasise again that a test based on the oitz  statistic is equivalent to testing 
the hypothesis that the CAAR on the tth day of the event window for acquiring 
firms where the consideration is solely in cash is the same as the CAAR on 
the tth day of the event window for acquiring firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash. 
 
5. Analysis of the Economic Benefits of M&A for Chinese Acquirers  
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the average abnormal returns (AARs) across 
the 279=N  Chinese acquiring firms over the 24 trading days comprising our 
event window.  It is readily observed from this table that the abnormal returns 
of Chinese acquiring firms are relatively small but statistically significant on 
the day prior to the takeover announcement date (that is, time -1).  For 
example, the AAR one day before the takeover announcement date is 0.29% 
based on Dimson (1979) betas and 0.20% based on OLS betas15.  However, 
both the significance and magnitude of the AARs hinge on the method used to 
estimate the parameters of the market model (OLS or Dimson) and the testing 
procedure employed to assess the significance of the AARs (Patell, Corrdao 
or modified Corrado).  Thus, if one uses the Dimson (1979) technique for 
parameter estimation, then the Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado test 
statistics for the AARs on the day before the takeover announcement date 
(that is, time -1 in Table 2) are both statistically significant at the 5% level.  
However, when parameter estimation is based on OLS, then both Corrado 
                                            
15 In order to lower investor burden, China has been continuing to cut transaction costs in 
trading shares in recent years.  The brokerage fee is currently 0.0087% which applies for both 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
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test statistics decline to the point where they are significant at the 10% level 
only.  Interestingly, the Patell (1976) test statistic is insignificant; and this 
applies irrespective of whether parameter estimation is based on the OLS or 
the Dimson (1979) techniques.    
 
The AARs for acquiring firms which are summarised in tabular form in Table 2 
are given graphical representation in Figure 1.  This graph shows that the 
AARs for the Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample are small and 
positive (though generally insignificant in a statistical sense) in the days 
leading up to the takeover announcement date.  Beyond the takeover 
announcement date, however, the AARs are generally small and negative 
culminating with a statistically significant negative abnormal return of just 
under one half of one per cent on the tenth day after the announcement date.  
Hence, any significant abnormal returns which accrue to the Chinese 
acquiring firms comprising our sample decay away in the few trading days 
subsequent to the takeover announcement date, so much so that the total of 
the abnormal returns is close to zero by the end of our event window.  In 
summary, our analysis shows that whilst Chinese acquiring firms obtain 
positive and significant economic benefits around the takeover announcement 
date, they tend to fall away in the few days subsequent to the announcement 
date.  
 
Table 3 summarises the CAARs for the Chinese acquiring firms comprising 
our sample.  This table shows in particular that there are significant positive 
CAARs on the trading day immediately preceding the takeover announcement 
date (that is, time -1) and on the first and second trading days subsequent to 
the takeover announcement date (that is, time 1 and time 2, respectively).  
Thus, for Dimson (1979) betas the Patell (1976) statistic on the first trading 
day after the takeover announcement date amounts to 2.6900.  This is 
significant at the 1% level.  The Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado 
statistics are significant at the 5% level at 2.2496 and 2.4877, respectively.  
These positive CAARs begin a process of gradual decay on the third and 
subsequent trading days following the takeover announcement date.  A 
graphical summary of the CAARs for the Chinese acquiring firms comprising 
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our sample is provided in Figure 2.  One can clearly see from the this graph 
that the CAARs based on Dimson (1979) betas reach a statistically significant 
peak of 1.66% on the first trading day following the takeover announcement 
date.16  However, the CAARs then gradually decay away from the third trading 
day subsequent to the takeover announcement date.   
 
In summary, our analysis here confirms what we found in Table 2; which is 
that there are some significant positive abnormal returns for Chinese acquiring 
firms around the takeover announcement date.  However, these significant 
and positive abnormal returns quickly decay away in the few days subsequent 
to the takeover announcement date.  In other words, shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms obtain significant positive economic benefits both in terms of 
AARs and CAARs for only a very short period surrounding the takeover 
announcement date. 
 
6. Discussion of reasons why Chinese case differs from Western 
literature 
 
One may contrast the above results for China with those appearing in the 
western literature, which show that western acquiring firms obtain virtually no 
economic benefits from their M&A activities.  For western firms the abnormal 
returns tend to be negative over most of the event window although there is 
mixed evidence on whether these are significantly different from zero (Bruner, 
2003; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  In contrast Chinese acquiring firms 
tend to earn statistically significant positive abnormal returns around the 
takeover announcement date.  It is important that we identify the underlying 
reasons for the significant differences which appear to exist between the 
wealth effects of Chinese and western M&A activities for acquiring firms.  To 
do this, we link our empirical results to the Chinese political, economic and 
capital systems, all of which are fundamentally different from those of western 
countries. 
   
In western countries target firms tend to negotiate the offer price with 
acquirers so as to maximise the price paid, whereas in the Chinese case there 
                                            
16 After deduction of brokerage fees which is currently 0.0087% the magnitude of CAAR is still 
relatively large. 
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is less scope for this since some parties are only entitled to the book value 
(and not the market value) of their shares.  Here the Chinese tender offer 
rules, which form part of the Takeover Measures 2006, provide that a Chinese 
acquiring firm must submit separate offer prices for the tradable shares and 
the non-tradable shares of the target firm.  The offer price for the tradable 
shares is determined by reference to the market price on the stock exchange 
of those shares whilst the offer price for the non-tradable shares is based on 
the net asset (book) value of the target firm as summarised in its latest set of 
audited financial statements. Here it is important to emphasise that prior to 
2005 non-tradable shares accounted for a majority of the shares on issue by 
most listed Chinese firms.17 Furthermore, regulatory approval needs to be 
given before the acquisition is publicly announced, which greatly reduces the 
prospect of a bidding war for the target. Consequently, in the Chinese case 
due to the environment within which acquisitions take place, the target has 
less capacity to inflate the offer price relative to western markets and hence it 
is intuitive that Chinese acquirers receive more economic benefit and higher 
CAARs than their western counterparts.  
   
7. Impact of Mode of Consideration on the AARs for Chinese Acquiring 
Firms 
 
We have previously noted how there is a substantial western literature which 
shows that the mode of consideration employed in takeovers can have a 
                                            
17 As previously noted, in April, 2005 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
implemented the Shareholding Structure Reform (Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) under which all non-
tradable A shares will eventually be converted into tradable A shares.  Under the 
Shareholding Structure Reform, representatives of the group of shareholders with tradable A 
shares agree terms and conditions for the conversion of non-tradable A shares into tradable A 
shares with representatives of the group of shareholders who hold the non-tradable A shares.  
The first firm to successfully convert its non-tradable A shares into tradable A shares under 
the Shareholding Structure Reform was the Sany Heavy Industry Company.  The agreement 
struck between the tradable and non-tradable shareholders of the Sany Heavy Industry 
Company specified that non-tradable A shareholders would not be permitted to sell any of 
their newly created tradable A shares on the stock exchange for the first two years after 
conversion.  Moreover, no more than 10% of their newly created tradable A shares could be 
sold on the stock exchange in the third year after conversion.  Thus the Sany Heavy Industry 
Company agreement, which is typical of the agreements which are being reached under the 
Shareholding Structure Reform, will mean that it was not until 2008 that any of the former 
non-tradable A shares actually became tradable – and even then, only a very small proportion 
of them.  This in turn means that the distinction between tradable and non-tradable shares 
remained in place for our entire sample period which, it will be recalled, is based on data 
covering the period from 1990 to 2008.  
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significant impact on the economic benefits which accrue to the shareholders 
of acquiring firms (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  In this section we 
present empirical evidence on this matter in relation to Chinese acquiring 
firms.  We commence our analysis by dividing the 279=N  Chinese acquiring 
firms comprising our sample into two categories.  The first category is 
comprised of 168 Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration.  The second category involves 45 acquiring firms where the 
mode of consideration is other than purely in cash.18  The alternative modes 
of consideration employed by these latter firms include the issue of shares by 
the acquiring firm, the issue of convertible bonds by the acquiring firm, 
warrants issued by the acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring 
firm’s assets to the shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of 
the target firm’s debt by the acquiring firm, or some combination of all of 
these.   
 
A summary of the AARs over the event window using Dimson (1979) 
estimates of beta and their associated Patell (1976) “t” statistics, Corrado 
(1989) “z” statistics and the modified Corrado “z” statistics for cash as against 
alternative modes of consideration is provided in Table 4. 19   A graphical 
summary of the AARs is given in Figure 3.  The second column of Table 4 
summarises the AARs across the 168 Chinese acquiring firms where the 
mode of consideration is solely in cash.  The third column summarises the 
AARs across the 45 acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration 
are employed.  For both pure cash and alternative modes of consideration the 
AARs tend to be positive in the six trading days prior to the takeover 
announcement date. On the takeover announcement date itself (time zero), 
there is a strong positive AAR of 0.92% for takeovers financed through 
alternative modes of consideration.  This compares with a modest AAR of 
0.06% on the same date for takeovers financed purely through cash.  After the 
                                            
18  We have previously noted that there are 66 firms for which there was insufficient 
information on the SDC database to identify the payment method used in the takeover.  We 
thus exclude these 66 firms from our empirical analysis. 
 
19  Our results do not vary according to whether they are based on Dimson (1979) estimates 
of beta or OLS estimates of beta. Thus, for brevity we report results based on the Dimson 
(1979) estimate of beta only. 
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takeover announcement date there are as many positive as there are negative 
AARs for both cash and alternative modes of consideration, although the 
positive AARs tend to be larger in absolute terms for takeovers financed 
through alternative modes of consideration. This reinforces our finding that the 
AARs for shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms with alternative modes of 
consideration tend to exceed the AARs for takeovers that are financed purely 
through cash.  
 
The fourth, seventh and tenth columns of Table 4 summarise the Patell (1976) 
“t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics associated with the AARs of the 168 acquiring firms where cash is 
the sole mode of consideration.  Here we have previously noted that the AARs 
over the period leading up to the takeover announcement date are all positive.  
However, none of the Patell (1976) “t” statistics associated with the AARs for 
this period turn out to be statistically significant at generally accepted levels.  
In contrast, both the Corrado (1989) and the modified Corrado “z” statistics 
are statistically significant at the 1% level on the takeover announcement date 
itself (with statistics of 2.7599 and 2.5423, respectively).  There is also a 
preponderance of negative AARs after the takeover announcement date.  The 
modified Corrado test provides evidence of this at the 5% level for both days 9 
and 10 of the event window, while the original Corrado (1989) test and the 
Patell (1976) test are significant at the 5% level on one of these days and at 
the 10% level on the other day.  
 
The fifth, eighth and eleventh columns of Table 4 summarise the Patell (1976) 
“t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics associated with the AARs of the 45 acquiring firms where alternative 
modes of consideration are employed.  Note that prior to the takeover 
announcement date the AARs for alternative modes of consideration are 
generally insignificantly different from zero.  On the takeover announcement 
date itself, when the AAR peaks at almost 1%, all three test statistics are 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  The modified Corrado test also 
identifies positive and statistically significant AARs on the second, sixth and 
eleventh trading days after the takeover announcement date as well as 
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statistically significant negative AARs on the ninth and thirteenth trading days 
after the takeover announcement date.  This contrasts with the Patell (1976) 
and Corrado (1989) tests which identify only two and three, respectively of 
these latter five AARs as being significantly different from zero.  
 
The sixth, ninth and twelfth columns of Table 4 summarise the z statistics for 
differences in the AARs between pure-cash and non-pure cash transactions. 
For all three tests, none of the z statistics are significant prior to the takeover 
announcement date.  However, the modified Corrado cotz  statistics are 
negative and significantly different from zero on the second, third and tenth 
trading days subsequent to the takeover announcement date.  The Corrado 
(1989) statistics are also significantly negative on the second and third trading 
days subsequent to the takeover announcement date.  These results imply 
that shareholders of acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration 
are employed obtain significantly larger AARs than shareholders of acquiring 
firms where the consideration is solely in cash only over a very narrow event 
window immediately after the takeover announcement date.  At other times in 
the event window there is very little evidence of significant differences in the 
wealth effects between pure cash takeovers and takeovers financed using 
alternative modes of consideration. 
 
We may summarise our analysis of Table 4 by noting that for takeovers 
financed purely through cash the Corrado (1989) and Modified Corrado “z” 
tests detect positive and significant economic benefits only on the takeover 
announcement date itself.  Subsequent to this date, however, all three tests 
show that there are occasional significant economic losses.  In contrast, there 
are significant positive economic benefits both on and after the takeover 
announcement date for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are employed.  Further, our analysis based 
on differences between the AARs for pure cash takeovers as against the 
AARs for alternative modes of consideration show that returns to alternative 
modes of consideration are only statistically larger for a few trading days 
immediately following the takeover announcement date itself.  
 
Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firms 
 
22 
 
8. Impact of Mode of Consideration on the CAARs for Chinese Acquiring 
Firms 
 
We now examine the impact that the mode of consideration has on the 
CAARs that accrue to shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms. Here Table 5 
summarises the CAARs based on Dimson (1979) betas20 and their associated 
Patell (1976) “t”, Corrado (1989) “z” and modified Corrado (Ataullah et al., 
2011) “z” scores for the 168 Chinese acquiring firms involved in pure-cash 
deals and the 45 deals where alternative modes of consideration were used.  
 
The second column of Table 5 shows that the CAARs for shareholders of 
acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration gradually 
increase in the run up to the takeover announcement date.  In particular, the 
CAAR peaks on the first trading day after the takeover announcement date at 
1.44%.  Beyond this date, however, the CAARs decay away quite sharply so 
much so that by the tenth trading day after the takeover announcement date 
the CAAR reaches a minimum over the entire event window of -0.16%.  In 
contrast, the third column of Table 5 shows that the CAARs for alternative 
modes of consideration gradually increase in magnitude until seven trading 
days after the takeover announcement date where they reach a peak of 
3.38%.  The CAARs tend to decline after this date and then stabilise towards 
the end of the event period at about 1.60%.  The CAARs for the pure cash 
and alternative modes of consideration are graphed in Figure 4 for Dimson 
(1979) betas.  A key finding, immediately apparent from Figure 4 and Table 5 
is that the overall CAARs of Chinese acquirers where alternative modes of 
consideration are employed are significantly larger than the CAARs where 
only cash is used. 
 
The fourth, seventh and tenth columns of Table 5 summarise the test scores 
associated with the Patell (1976), Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado 
statistics for CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the consideration is 
solely in cash.  Note how the test scores associated with the CAARs for all 
three statistics are not significantly different from zero except on the takeover 
                                            
20  Our results do not vary according to whether they are based on Dimson (1979) estimates 
of beta or OLS estimates of beta. Thus, for brevity we only report results based on the 
Dimson (1979) estimate of beta. 
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announcement date itself (t=0) and the first trading day after the takeover 
announcement date (t=1).  All three tests find that the CAAR is significantly 
different from zero on the first trading day after the takeover announcement 
date at the 10% level or better and the Corrado (1989) test also finds that the 
CAAR is significant at the 5% level on the takeover announcement date itself.  
However, this significance disappears as the event window progresses.  
Overall, we conclude that there is minimal statistical evidence of economic 
benefits for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when the mode of 
consideration is purely in cash. 
 
The fifth, eighth and eleventh columns of Table 5 summarise the test scores 
associated with the Patell (1976), Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado 
statistics for CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are used. Here, the Patell (1976) test results indicate that 
almost all of the CAARs over the event window are insignificantly different 
from zero.  This is in marked contrast with the test scores for the Corrado 
(1989) and modified Corrado “z” statistics which are significant at the 10% 
level or better on the second through until at least the eighth trading day after 
the takeover announcement date. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that there are significant economic benefits for the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms when alternative modes of consideration are 
employed. 
 
Our analysis up to this point suggests that the CAARs which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are employed tend to be larger than the CAARs for pure cash 
deals.  We now report the results of a formal test of this hypothesis.  Here, the  
sixth, ninth and twelfth columns of Table 5 summarise the z statistics 
associated with the differences between the CAARs for pure cash as against 
alternative modes of consideration for the Patell (1976), Corrado (1989) and 
modified Corrado test statistics.  Interestingly, for the Patell (1976) test and 
the original Corrado (1989) test none of the z scores are statistically different 
from zero at any point during the entire event window.  However, the cotz  
statistics associated with the modified Corrado test as summarised in the 
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twelfth column of Table 5 shows that from the fifth trading day after the 
takeover announcement date until the end of the event window the vast 
majority of cotz  statistics are negative and significantly different from zero.  
This result is compatible with the hypothesis that the CAARs accruing to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are employed exceed the CAARs for the shareholders of 
acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration.  This is a 
particularly interesting result in light of the fact that Ataullah et al. (2011) have 
shown that the modified Corrado test is likely to have significantly more power 
than either the Patell (1976) or original Corrado (1989) test when stock returns 
do not evolve in terms of the normal distribution.  
 
In summary, the analysis reported in Table 5 shows that when cash is used as 
the sole mode of consideration, there are no significant economic benefits for 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms apart from a very narrow window 
surrounding the takeover announcement date.  However when alternative 
modes of consideration are employed there are significant economic benefits 
for the shareholders of acquiring firms over the vast majority of the event 
window subsequent to the takeover announcement date.  Moreover, the 
CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are used are larger than the CAARs for 
shareholders of acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration.  This is in marked contrast to results summarised in the 
western literature (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
 
9. Potential Reasons Contributing to the Larger Economic Benefits for 
non-cash deals than pure cash takeovers 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration in Chinese M&A activities shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms obtain no significant economic benefits either in terms of the AARs or 
CAARs that arise in a 24-day event window surrounding the takeover 
announcement date.  However, when alternative modes of consideration are 
employed the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms achieve significant 
economic benefits from takeovers in terms of both the AARs and the CAARs 
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which arise over the event window.  We now provide a brief summary of the 
possible reasons as to why the CAARs for Chinese acquiring firms that use 
alternative modes of consideration are larger than the CAARs for acquiring 
firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration.   
 
Huang and Walking (1987) note that when cash is employed as the sole mode 
of consideration, target firms will tend to demand higher takeover premiums 
due to the capital gains tax which will have to be paid by the shareholders of 
the target firm immediately after the takeover is consummated.  However, if 
alternative modes of consideration are employed (shares, in particular) then 
the capital gains tax21 can be deferred until such times as the shares issued 
by the acquiring firm to finance the takeover are sold.  Thus, the lower costs 
associated with using alternative modes of consideration should mean that 
there will be greater economic benefits for the shareholders of the acquiring 
firm.  This hypothesis is consistent with our empirical results which show that 
the economic benefits for shareholders of acquiring firms are larger when 
alternative modes of consideration are used to finance M&A activities.  Our 
evidence is particularly interesting given that the majority of prior US and 
developed market evidence does not support this tax hypothesis, since cash 
deals earn higher CAARs than non-cash deals in developed markets 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).   
 
A second reason is that acquiring firms will prefer to use alternative modes of 
consideration because of the information asymmetries that arise in the 
takeover process (Hansen, 1987).  In particular, target firms will tend to have 
a much better understanding of the value their own physical assets, their 
productive activities and their prospective contractual arrangements.  
Moreover, acquiring firms will have private information about the intrinsic 
value of their own shares.  Hansen (1987) argues that these information 
asymmetries may lead acquiring firms to offer stock rather than cash for the 
proposed takeover, especially when the acquiring firm knows that its shares 
are over-valued on the stock market.  The difference between the stock 
market value of the acquiring firm’s shares and their intrinsic value will lower 
                                            
21 The capital gain tax stands at 20% in China. 
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the implicit cost of the takeover and thereby increase the economic benefits 
that accrue to the shareholders of the acquiring firm.  Financing the takeover 
through the acquiring firm’s stock rather than cash also transfers some of the 
risks associated with the takeover from the acquiring firm’s shareholders to 
the target firm’s shareholders. 
 
We now conduct additional empirical analysis to test the predictions of 
Hansen (1987).  First, we examine if the choice of mode of consideration is 
related to the relative value of the acquiring firm’s stock and secondly, we 
examine whether the difference in CAARs for alternative modes of 
consideration versus cash offers is driven by the relatively high valued firms 
comprising our sample.  In our analysis we examine the log market-adjusted 
earnings-price ratio as our valuation measure.22  The lower the log market-
adjusted earnings-price (EP) ratio the more highly valued the company is.  We 
use two dummy variables as indicators of overvaluation in both tests related to 
EP. Over_Val_Med is 1 if the market-adjusted earnings-price ratio is below 
the median and Over_Val_33 is 1 if the market-adjusted earnings-price ratio is 
below the 33rd percentile. We also include four measures based on market-
adjusted book-market ratio (BM); these provide additional robustness by using 
an alternative valuation proxy and versions are estimated where the market 
adjustment is done on the basis of the equally-weighted ratio  (WC1) and the 
median (WC2). For examining if the mode of consideration is affected by 
valuation we also use the log market-adjusted earnings-price ratio itself; that 
is, log EP difference and the rank of the log market-adjusted earnings-price 
ratio (log EP difference rank). 
 
Table 6 reports results from logit regressions of a dummy variable for the 
mode of consideration (1 if alternative consideration; 0 if pure cash) on 
measures of valuation. These demonstrate strong support for the Hansen 
                                            
22 That is the natural logarithm of the firm’s earnings-price ratio plus 0.001 minus the natural 
logarithm of the market earnings-price ratio plus 0.001 [ln (0.001 + EPi) – ln  (0.001 + EPM)].  
Here we follow Boudoukh et al. (2007, p. 893) in adding 0.001 to all earnings-price ratios in 
order to insure that the argument of the logarithmic function is strictly positive.  Using a log 
transformation means that our results are not sensitive to whether earnings-price ratio or 
price-earnings ratio is used. However, we also based our logit regressions on several other 
transformations - for example, the inverse sinh which is often used to mitigate problems of 
heteroscedasticity (Anscombe, 1948; Laubscher, 1961; Sokal and Rohlf, 1981) - with little 
difference to the results summarised in Table 6.   
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(1987) prediction that more over-valued acquirers are more likely to use 
alternative modes of consideration.  For example, the coefficient on log EP 
difference rank is 0.007, which is statistically significant at all conventional 
levels. The positive coefficient indicates that an increase in rank leads to a 
higher likelihood that an alternative mode of consideration will be used. This 
positive significant effect is corroborated by all the valuation dummy variables 
both those based on EP and on BM. In appendix B. 6 we included some 
control variables for the mode of consideration, which are linked to the size of 
retained earnings (cash reserves to market ratio and operating margin 
(operating income / sales)) or the ease of accessing external market financing 
(log of market capitalisation). The main results for over-valuation proxies are 
generally strengthened compared to Table 6. We can report that none of the 
control variables were statistically significant in any regression at the 5% level 
and only log market capitalisation was ever significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 7 reports results from Mann-Whitney tests of equal ranks. We examine 
the ranks of the CAARs grouped by the mode of consideration.  We report 
results for 2 windows, the immediate period around the earnings 
announcement (t-1 to t+2), and the full sample period (t-6 to t+17). The results 
from panel A indicate for the full sample that the cash deals have lower CAAR 
ranks than the alternative deals for both CAAR windows; this is consistent 
with our previous analysis in section 8.  When we run sub-sample analysis, in 
panel B, only for those acquiring firms which are over-valued, then we also 
find that cash deals have lower CAAR ranks than the alternative deals. This 
result is relatively insensitive to the overvaluation dummy used or to the CAAR 
window selected; all the p-values in panel B are less than 0.06.  In contrast, in 
panel C, when we run sub-sample analysis only for those firms that are not 
highly valued, we find that the CAAR ranks are similar regardless of the mode 
of consideration; that is, CAAR is unrelated to mode of consideration when 
firms are not highly valued.  These results strongly support Hansen’s (1987) 
assertion that the economic benefits for over-valued acquiring firms from 
alternative modes of consideration will be larger than those from pure cash 
deals.  
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Our empirical results also have some important implications for practice.  
They show in particular that financing M&A activities through alternative 
modes of consideration brings significant economic benefits to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  In contrast, when cash is used as 
the sole mode of consideration there are few if any economic benefits for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms.  Hence, if Chinese acquiring firms are to 
maximise the economic benefits that accrue to their shareholders they should 
normally finance their M&A activities using alternative modes of consideration. 
Given this, it is somewhat perplexing that the vast majority of Chinese 
takeovers continue to be financed solely in cash, even after the 
implementation of the shareholding structure reforms of 2005 (Guquan Fenzhi 
Gaige) which both facilitated and encouraged the use of alternative modes of 
consideration in Chinese M&A activities. 
 
10. Summary and Conclusions 
  
This paper provides the first detailed empirical analysis of the economic 
benefits which accrue to shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms as a result of 
their M&A activities.  Our empirical evidence on the returns earned by 
Chinese acquiring firms provides three main findings: i) Chinese acquirers 
overall have positive abnormal returns.  This contrasts with the vast majority 
of prior western literature which shows that there are on average losses (albeit 
not necessarily statistically significant) for acquiring firms in developed 
countries. ii) Takeovers involving alternative modes of consideration have 
higher abnormal returns than cash deals, again in clear contrast to the vast 
majority of prior literature for developed countries. iii) The difference in CAARs 
between alternative modes of consideration and cash is driven by firms that 
are highly valued; this result is consistent with the theoretical model of Hansen 
(1987). 
 
We especially investigate the effect of using cash as against alternative 
modes of consideration (e.g. shares of the acquiring firm, warrants on shares 
of the acquiring firm, debt repayment, etc. and mixtures thereof) in M&A 
activities.  Our analysis shows that both the AARs and CAARs that accrue to 
the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when alternative modes of 
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consideration are used are positive and significantly different from zero in a 
statistical sense.  In contrast, the economic benefits for shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration 
tend to be insignificantly different from zero and often, negative.  Formal tests 
of the hypothesis that the abnormal returns for Chinese acquiring firms which 
use alternative modes of consideration are greater than the abnormal returns  
for acquiring firms which only use cash show that the modified Corrado test 
provides consistent evidence of statistical differences between the abnormal 
returns for the two modes of consideration. This contrasts with the Patell 
(1976) and Corrado (1989) tests which often detect little difference between 
the abnormal returns for the two modes of consideration.  Thus, our empirical 
analysis confirms that the modified Corrado test is generally more powerful 
than any of the traditionally used tests in the area (Ataullah et al., 2011).    
 
Our empirical analysis also shows that takeovers financed through alternative 
modes of consideration generate significantly higher abnormal returns than 
takeovers financed purely through cash.  Again this contrasts with the vast 
majority of existing literature for developed countries.  We outlined two main 
potential reasons as to why this is the case.  First, in China a capital gains tax 
of 20% must be paid immediately by the target firm’s shareholders when cash 
is used to finance the takeover.  In contrast, when alternative modes of 
consideration are used, it is normally possible to defer the payment of the 
capital gains tax.  Second, the information asymmetries that arise in the 
takeover process may lead acquiring firms to offer stock rather than cash for 
the proposed takeover, especially when the acquiring firm knows that its 
shares are over-valued on the stock market (Hansen, 1987).  The difference 
between the stock market value of the acquiring firm’s shares and their 
intrinsic value will lower the implicit cost of the takeover and thereby increase 
the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of the acquiring firm.  
We provide empirical evidence to support both these points: i) the mode of 
consideration only affects CAARs earned by acquiring firms which are highly 
valued and ii) highly valued companies are more likely to use alternative 
modes of consideration than cash.  These considerations, when taken in 
conjunction with our empirical analysis, show that highly valued Chinese 
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acquiring firms ought to employ alternative modes of consideration if they are 
to maximise the economic benefits that accrue to their shareholders from 
M&A activities.  Given this, it is somewhat perplexing that a large majority of 
Chinese M&A activities, even for highly valued firms, continue to be financed 
solely through cash.  
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Table 1: Industrial classifications and Dates of Takeovers for N=279 Chinese Acquiring firms 
Industry 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Automobiles & Parts 
       
1 
 
2 1 
 
2 2 8 
Beverages 
   
1 1 3 2 
       
7 
Chemicals 
  
1 
    
1 2 3 
  
2 10 19 
Construction & Materials 
   
1
    
1 2 1 3 5 5 18 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
     
1 
 
1 1 
  
1 
 
4 8 
Electricity 
       
2 2 1
 
1 4 4 14 
Financial Services 
           
1 
 
1 2 
Food Producers 
       
2 
 
1 4 2 2 3 14 
Forestry & Paper 
         
1 1 2 1 4 9 
General Industrials 
        
1 
  
1 1 2 5 
General Retailers 
         
1 1 
 
2 1 5 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 
           
2 1 
 
3 
Household Goods & Home Construct 
          
2 1 2 5 
Industrial Engineering 
       
2 
 
1 
 
4 3 9 19 
Industrial Metals & Mining 
        
1 4 2 1 3 8 19 
Industrial Transportation 
        
1 1 1 
  
1 4 
Leisure Goods 
         
1 2 
 
1 3 7 
Media 
       
1 1 
   
1 
 
3 
Mining 
        
1 
 
1 
 
2 6 10 
Oil & Gas Producers 
        
1 1 1 
 
1 1 5 
Personal Goods 
        
3 2 2 
 
1 2 10 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
        
1 4 1 2 4 7 19 
Real Estate Investment & Services 1 
       
2 2 2 1 10 11 29 
Software & Computer services 
         
1 2 3 1 1 8 
Support Services 
        
2 1 1 
 
3 4 11 
Technology, Hardware & Equipment 
  
1 
    
1 1 1 2 3 
 
9 
Travel & Leisure 
    
1
    
2 
  
1 5 9 
Totals 1 0 1 3 2 4 2 10 21 32 24 28 55 96 279 
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Table 2: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese Acquiring Firms Covering the Period from January, 1990 until December, 2008 
 Dimson Betas OLS Betas 
Time AARs 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic AARs 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
         
-6 -0.0001 0.21 -0.29 0.00 -0.0015 -0.13 -0.51 -0.37 
-5 0.0016 0.15 -0.57 -0.58 0.0031 1.02 -0.48 -0.50 
-4 0.0033 1.70* 0.62 0.65 0.0031 1.61 0.60 0.64 
-3 0.0027 1.04 0.94 0.98 0.0028 1.01 1.05 1.11 
-2 0.0029 1.22 0.83 0.87 0.0041 1.71* 1.27 1.34 
-1 0.0029 1.09 2.32# 2.42# 0.0020 0.74 1.76* 1.85* 
0 0.0006 0.61 1.32 1.14 0.0014 0.85 1.87* 1.63 
1 0.0026 0.97 1.19 1.24 0.0027 0.70 1.31 1.38 
2 -0.0042 -1.62 -1.60 -1.67* -0.0036 -1.42 -1.36 -1.42 
3 -0.0002 -1.46 -1.47 -1.50 0.0006 -1.19 -1.15 -1.21 
4 -0.0022 -1.97# -2.03# -2.11# -0.0013 -1.80* -1.75* -1.83* 
5 -0.0040 -0.68 -0.41 -0.42 -0.0043 -0.55 -0.65 -0.68 
6 0.0038 0.87 1.80* 1.88* 0.0038 0.67 1.81* 1.90* 
7 -0.0045 -1.51 -1.84* -1.92* -0.0039 -1.36 -1.73* -1.81* 
8 0.0015 0.42 -0.35 -0.37 0.0017 0.57 -0.31 -0.32 
9 -0.0018 -1.41 -0.63 -0.66 -0.0022 -1.51 -0.43 -0.45 
10 -0.0046 -2.03# -2.27# -2.36# -0.0044 -1.81* -2.51# -2.63$ 
11 0.0011 1.56 1.27 1.33 0.0002 0.83 1.18 1.25 
12 -0.0009 0.35 -0.94 -0.97 -0.0011 0.50 -0.79 -0.83 
13 -0.0019 -0.85 -1.63 -1.70* -0.0018 -0.80 -1.63 -1.71* 
14 0.0010 0.23 -0.66 -0.67 0.0021 0.51 -0.67 -0.70 
15 0.0015 0.96 0.03 0.03 0.0003 0.54 0.18 0.19 
16 0.0005 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.0002 0.45 -0.03 -0.02 
17 0.0021 0.90 0.35 0.28 0.0010 0.77 -0.09 0.01 
      
* significant at 10%; $  significant at 5%; # significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese Acquiring Firms Covering the Period January, 1990 until December, 2008 
 Dimson Betas OLS Betas 
Time CAARs 
Patell 
Statistic 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic CAARs 
Patell 
Statistic 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
         
-6 -0.0001 0.21 -0.29 0.00 -0.0015 -0.03 -0.51 -0.42 
-5 0.0015 0.18 -0.61 -0.48 0.0017 0.85 -0.70 -0.77 
-4 0.0049 1.07 -0.14 0.00 0.0048 1.53 -0.23 -0.29 
-3 0.0075 1.52 0.35 0.58 0.0075 1.94* 0.33 0.52 
-2 0.0104 1.86* 0.69 0.89 0.0116 2.50# 0.86 1.03 
-1 0.0134 2.26# 1.57 1.84* 0.0136 2.62$ 1.50 1.67* 
0 0.0140 1.45 1.96# 1.21 0.0149 1.95* 2.10# 1.40 
1 0.0166 2.69$ 2.25# 2.49# 0.0176 2.98$ 2.43# 2.51# 
2 0.0124 1.65* 1.59 1.76* 0.0140 1.99# 1.84* 1.88* 
3 0.0122 1.08 1.04 1.16 0.0146 1.45 1.38 1.19 
4 0.0101 0.44 0.38 0.43 0.0133 0.80 0.78 0.60 
5 0.0061 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.0090 0.60 0.56 0.51 
6 0.0099 0.43 0.73 0.81 0.0128 0.73 1.04 0.90 
7 0.0054 0.08 0.22 0.24 0.0088 0.36 0.54 0.42 
8 0.0069 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.0105 0.47 0.45 0.27 
9 0.0052 -0.12 -0.04 -0.05 0.0083 0.13 0.32 0.17 
10 0.0006 -0.46 -0.59 -0.65 0.0039 -0.19 -0.30 -0.45 
11 0.0017 -0.21 -0.28 -0.31 0.0041 -0.05 -0.01 -0.19 
12 0.0008 -0.15 -0.48 -0.54 0.0030 0.04 -0.19 -0.21 
13 -0.0010 -0.28 -0.84 -0.93 0.0013 -0.10 -0.55 -0.79 
14 -0.0001 -0.26 -0.96 -1.07 0.0034 -0.02 -0.68 -0.82 
15 0.0014 -0.09 -0.93 -1.04 0.0037 0.08 -0.63 -0.74 
16 0.0019 0.00 -0.79 -0.88 0.0039 0.15 -0.62 -0.66 
17 0.0040 0.85 -0.70 -0.66 0.0049 1.37 -0.63 -0.68 
         
* significant at 10%; $  significant at 5%; # significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 4: Average Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms - Modes of Consideration 
 Abnormal Returns   Patell Test   Corrado Test Modified Corrado Test 
Time AR-Cash AR-Alt  t-Cash t-Alt Z-Diff  Z-Cash Z-Alt Z-Diff Z-Cash Z-Alt Z-Diff 
              
-6 0.0014 0.0006  0.55 0.24 0.22  0.22 -0.22 0.31 -0.14 0.13 -0.20 
-5 0.0027 -0.0026  -0.12 -0.41 0.21  -0.62 -0.32 -0.21 -0.69 -0.34 -0.25 
-4 0.0036 0.0020  1.01 1.52 -0.37  0.30 1.02 -0.51 0.34 1.09 -0.53 
-3 0.0037 0.0037  1.41 -0.23 1.16  1.70* -0.28 1.40 1.90* -0.29 1.55 
-2 -0.0011 0.0046  -0.13 1.14 -0.90  -0.58 0.76 -0.95 -0.64 0.82 -1.03 
-1 0.0012 0.0020  0.40 0.81 -0.29  1.35 0.68 0.48 1.52 0.73 0.56 
0 0.0006 0.0092  0.97 1.96* -0.70  2.76$ 1.85* 0.65 2.54$ 1.67* 0.62 
1 0.0023 0.0026  0.47 0.07 0.28  0.38 0.51 -0.09 0.42 0.54 -0.08 
2 -0.0039 0.0036  -0.92 0.25 -0.82  -1.86* 1.66* -2.49$ -2.07# 1.78* -2.72$ 
3 -0.0006 0.0024  -1.60 -0.20 -0.99  -1.80* 0.68 -1.75* -2.01# 0.73 -1.93* 
4 -0.0029 -0.0018  -1.53 -0.54 -0.70  -1.60 -0.28 -0.94 -1.79* -0.29 -1.06 
5 -0.0023 -0.0017  -0.47 -0.64 0.12  -0.87 0.04 -0.64 -0.97 0.05 -0.72 
6 0.0003 0.0087  0.37 0.89 -0.37  0.93 1.89* -0.68 1.04 2.01# -0.69 
7 -0.0001 0.0006  -0.26 0.04 -0.21  -0.32 -0.29 -0.02 -0.35 -0.30 -0.04 
8 0.0019 -0.0057  1.28 -1.14 1.71*  0.81 -1.23 1.44 0.91 -1.31 1.57 
9 -0.0035 -0.0113  -2.29# -2.44# 0.11  -1.83* -1.60 -0.16 -2.05# -1.71* -0.24 
10 -0.0049 -0.0034  -1.93* -0.83 -0.78  -2.06# 0.04 -1.48 -2.29# 0.05 -1.65* 
11 0.0014 0.0063  0.60 2.11# -1.07  0.41 2.12# -1.21 0.46 2.26# -1.27 
12 -0.0003 0.0021  0.26 0.56 -0.21  -0.84 -0.10 -0.52 -0.94 -0.10 -0.59 
13 0.0006 -0.0082  0.53 -1.48 1.43  0.00 -1.63 1.15 0.00 -1.73* 1.23 
14 -0.0003 0.0002  -0.13 0.53 -0.46  -0.70 -0.53 -0.12 -0.78 -0.56 -0.16 
15 0.0024 0.0071  1.47 1.32 0.10  0.30 1.04 -0.53 0.33 1.11 -0.55 
16 0.0006 -0.0008  0.41 -0.16 0.40  0.39 -0.30 0.49 0.44 -0.32 0.53 
17 0.0002 -0.0039  -0.04 -0.45 0.29  -0.21 -0.99 0.55 -0.21 -0.80 0.42 
* significant at 10%; $  significant at 5%; # significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Acquirers - Modes of Consideration 
 CAARs    Patell Test    Corrado Test Modified Corrado Test 
 Time CAR-Cash CAR-Alt  t-Cash       t-Alt     Z-Diff  Z-Cash Z-Alt     Z-Diff    Z-Cash       Z-Alt     Z-Diff 
              
-6  0.0014   0.0006   0.53 0.24 0.21  1.00 -0.22 0.86 -0.11 0.13 -0.17 
-5  0.0041  -0.0020   0.24 -0.44 0.47  0.56 -0.38 0.66 -0.62 -0.34 -0.20 
-4  0.0077  -0.0001   0.76 0.67 0.06  0.63 0.28 0.25 -0.29 0.43 -0.51 
-3  0.0114   0.0036   1.29 0.52 0.54  1.27 0.10 0.83 0.75 0.31 0.31 
-2  0.0104   0.0083   1.07 0.96 0.07  0.96 0.43 0.37 0.32 0.65 -0.23 
-1  0.0115   0.0103   1.17 1.22 -0.04  1.37 0.67 0.50 0.96 0.91 0.04 
0  0.0121   0.0195   0.51 1.41 -0.63  2.22# 1.32 0.63 0.70 1.16 -0.32 
1  0.0144   0.0221   1.70* 1.62 0.05  2.22# 1.41 0.57 1.89* 1.54 0.25 
2  0.0106   0.0257   1.13 1.24 -0.08  1.56 1.87* -0.23 1.05 2.08# -0.73 
3  0.0100   0.0280   0.65 0.86 -0.15  0.97 2.00# -0.73 0.32 2.20# -1.33 
4  0.0071   0.0262   0.20 0.50 -0.21  0.49 1.83* -0.95 -0.29 2.00# -1.62 
5  0.0047   0.0245   0.07 0.31 -0.17  0.24 1.76* -1.08 -0.57 1.94* -1.77* 
6  0.0050   0.0332   0.16 0.45 -0.20  0.47 2.22# -1.23 -0.24 2.45# -1.91* 
7  0.0049   0.0338   0.08 0.42 -0.24  0.38 2.06# -1.19 -0.36 2.28# -1.86* 
8  0.0068   0.0281   0.39 0.20 0.13  0.56 1.67* -0.79 -0.11 1.84* -1.38 
9  0.0033   0.0168  -0.14 -0.13 -0.01  0.11 1.22 -0.78 -0.65 1.34 -1.40 
10 -0.0016   0.0134  -0.56 -0.22 -0.24  -0.36 1.19 -1.10 -1.23 1.32 -1.80* 
11 -0.0002   0.0197  -0.42 -0.05 -0.27  -0.26 1.66* -1.36 -1.07 1.84* -2.06# 
12 -0.0005   0.0218  -0.36 0.01 -0.26  -0.44 1.59 -1.43 -1.28 1.77* -2.15# 
13  0.0000   0.0137  -0.23 -0.13 -0.07  -0.43 1.18 -1.14 -1.25 1.31 -1.81* 
14 -0.0003   0.0139  -0.27 -0.09 -0.13  -0.56 1.04 -1.14 -1.41 1.15 -1.81* 
15  0.0021   0.0210   0.04 0.03 0.01  -0.49 1.24 -1.22 -1.31 1.38 -1.90* 
16  0.0027   0.0201   0.12 0.02 0.07  -0.40 1.15 -1.10 -1.18 1.28 -1.74* 
17  0.0029   0.0162   0.43 2.54$ -1.49  -0.44 0.92 -0.96 -0.75 2.59$ -2.36# 
* significant at 10%; $  significant at 5%; # significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Notes: This table reports results for a logit regression of a single explanatory variable: 
 
ubXaDM ++=  
 
where the dependent variable DM is a dummy variable that is 0 if the mode of consideration is 
cash and 1 if an alternative mode of consideration is used and the X variable, is listed in 
Column 1.  EP log difference is the market adjusted log EP ratio; that is, the log of 0.001 plus 
EP ratio minus the log of 0.001 plus EP ratio of the market. EP log difference RANK is simply 
the rank of firms by EP log difference. Results in the bottom half of the table are based on 
dummy variables that are 1 if the acquiring firm is over-valued and 0 otherwise. We use two 
thresholds. Over_Val_MED (log difference) is 1 if the market-adjusted log earnings-price ratio 
is below the median and Over_Val_33 (log difference) is 1 if the market-adjusted log 
earnings-price ratio is below the 33rd percentile. We then construct measures on using book-
market ratio (BM) in a similar way. BM1 is calculated using the equally-weighted  average 
book-market ratio as the benchmark while BM2 using the median book-market ratio as the 
benchmark. Thus Over_Val _MED_BM1  is 1 if the book-market ratio adjusted using the 
equally weighted market average is below the median of our acquirers sample. 
Over_Val_33_BM2 is 1 if the book-market ratio adjusted using the market median is below 
the 33rd percentile of our acquirers sample. * is statistically significant at the 10% level and $ is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 6: Simple Logit Regressions 
 
Independent 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic p-val 
    
EP log difference -0.354 -2.91 0.00$ 
    
EP log difference 
RANK 0.007 2.89 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_MED (log 
difference) 0.703 1.91 0.06* 
    
Over_Val_33 
(log difference) 1.079 2.95 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_MED_BM1 2.136 3.76 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_MED_BM2 2.105 3.71 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_33_BM1 1.564 3.59 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_33_BM2 1.564 3.59 0.00$ 
Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firms 
 
41 
 
Notes: these are Mann-Whitney tests conducted on the ranked sum of the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns as given in the Independent Variable 
column. These are grouped by the mode of consideration dummy variable, DM, which is 0 if the mode of consideration is pure cash and 1 for alternative 
modes of consideration. Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B reports results for the over-valued sample and Panel C reports results for the not 
over-valued sample. Overvaluation is measured by the market-adjusted log earnings-price ratio or log book-market ratio; Over_Val_Med uses the median as 
the cut-off point and Over_Val_33 uses the 33rd percentile as the cut-off point. 
Table 7: Mann-Whitney Tests    
Panel A: Full Sample       
Independent 
Variable 
Over-valuation 
Variable z-Statistic p-Val 
 
   
        
CAAR(-1,+2) None -2.307 0.021$     
CAAR(-6,+17) None -1.646 0.100*     
        
Panel B: Over-valued Sample       
Independent 
Variable 
Over-valuation 
Variable z-Statistic p-Val 
 Over-valuation 
Variable z-Statistic p-Val 
        
CAAR(-1,+2) Over_Val_MED -2.321 0.020$  Over_Val_33 -2.122 0.034$ 
CAAR(-1,+2) Over_Val_MED_BM1 -2.982 0.003$  Over_Val_33_BM1 -3.062 0.002$ 
CAAR(-1,+2) Over_Val_MED_BM2 -2.989 0.003$  Over_Val_33_BM2 -2.816 0.005$ 
CAAR(-6,+17) Over_Val_MED -2.211 0.027$  Over_Val_33 -1.925 0.054* 
CAAR(-6,+17) Over_Val_MED_BM1 -1.996 0.046$  Over_Val_33_BM1 -2.473 0.013$ 
CAAR(-6,+17) Over_Val_MED_BM2 -2.110 0.035$  Over_Val_33_BM2 -2.303 0.021$ 
        
Panel C: Not over-valued Sample       
Independent 
Variable 
Over-valuation 
Variable z-Statistic p-Val 
 Over-valuation 
Variable z-Statistic p-Val 
        
CAAR(-1,+2) Over_Val_MED -1.599 0.110  Over_Val_33 -1.625 0.104 
CAAR(-1,+2) Over_Val_MED_BM1 -0.340 0.734  Over_Val_33_BM1 -0.998 0.318 
CAAR(-1,+2) Over_Val_MED_BM2 -0.323 0.747  Over_Val_33_BM2 -1.095 0.274 
CAAR(-6,+17) Over_Val_MED -0.427 0.669  Over_Val_33 -0.757 0.449 
CAAR(-6,+17) Over_Val_MED_BM1 -0.276 0.782  Over_Val_33_BM1 -0.804 0.421 
CAAR(-6,+17) Over_Val_MED_BM2 -0.258 0.796  Over_Val_33_BM2 -0.872 0.383 
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Figure 1: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese Acquiring Firms with A 
Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese Acquiring Firms 
with A Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 
2008 
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Figure 3:  Average Abnormal Returns Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese 
Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 for Cash (N 
= 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Based on Dimson (1979) Betas 
for Chinese Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008  for Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of 
Consideration 
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Notes: This table reports results for the following logit regression: 
 
1
I
M i i
i
D a bX Z uδ
=
= + + +∑  
 
where the dependent variable DM is a dummy variable that is 0 if the mode of consideration is 
cash and 1 if the mode of consideration is an alternative mode of consideration. The X 
variable, is listed in Column 1 and the Z variables are i) cash reserves to book value, ii) 
operating margin and iii) log of the market value.  EP log difference is the market adjusted log 
EP ratio; that is, the log of 0.001 plus EP ratio minus the log of 0.001 plus EP ratio of the 
market. EP log difference RANK is simply the rank of firms by EP log difference. Results in 
the bottom half of the table are based on dummy variables that are 1 if the acquiring firm is 
over-valued and 0 otherwise. We use two thresholds. Over_Val_MED (log difference) is 1 if 
the market-adjusted log earnings-price ratio is below the median and Over_Val_33 (log 
difference) is 1 if the market-adjusted log earnings-price ratio is below the 33rd percentile. We 
then construct measures on using book-market ratio (BM) in a similar way. BM1 is calculated 
using the equally-weighted  average book-market ratio as the benchmark while BM2 using the 
median book-market ratio as the benchmark. Thus Over_Val _MED_BM1  is 1 if the book-
market ratio adjusted using the equally weighted market average is below the median of our 
acquirers sample. Over_Val_33_BM2 is 1 if the book-market ratio adjusted using the market 
median is below the 33rd percentile of our acquirers sample. * is statistically significant at the 
10% level and $ is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Appendix Table B.6: Logit Regressions including control variables 
 
Independent 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic p-val 
    
EP log difference -0.443 -2.73 0.01$ 
    
EP log difference 
RANK 0.011 3.03 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_MED (log 
difference) 0.993 1.99 0.05$ 
    
Over_Val_33 
(log difference) 1.444 2.94 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_MED_BM1 2.448 3.90 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_MED_BM2 2.396 3.83 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_33_BM1 1.651 3.33 0.00$ 
    
Over_Val_33_BM2 1.657 3.35 0.00$ 
